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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: 
THE PARADOX OF INTERESTS AND REFORMS
The 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by sweeping, radical neoliberal, 
monetarist-inspired economic reforms designed to correct fi nancial or structural 
crises. Latin American countries initiated the wave, followed by Eastern Europe and 
the former USSR, although the timing, scope, and policies varied. Often one reads 
accounts of friends and foes of reform lined up to do battle in domestic and 
international alliances. However, reform processes and outcomes do not always 
follow the formula of reformers versus conservatives; there is more to the balance of 
power than these all-too-common accounts would suggest. Industrial managers in 
the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia and business elites in Argentina initially 
accepted reforms that would soon harm them. Soviet industrial managers, with their 
hands on levers of Soviet and early post-Soviet production, did not wholeheartedly 
embrace increasingly radical economic reforms, but neither did they reject them, or 
prepare for the uncertainty and systemic shocks that marketization would bring. 
Unlike younger entrepreneurs, they did not play games of speculation to accumulate 
capital; rather, they played on the margins of the law to improve gains and positions 
somewhat. However the extent of these practices didn’t come close to guarding them 
against what would come. In Argentina, business elites themselves initiated economic 
reforms that they thought would bring them the opportunity to participate in 
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privatization at low cost, with high gains and increased autonomy from state 
regulation. In the end, however, the state picked up the reforms and expanded them, 
with the result that business elites faced increased competition that went beyond 
short-term challenges to their security.
Why was this so? With the benefi t of hindsight, one would advise the Soviet 
managers (“Red Directors”) either to fi ght reforms tooth and nail or prepare 
themselves for the onslaught, possibly by playing the speculation game as the 
younger generation was beginning to do. One might suggest something similar to 
the Argentine businessmen. Yet seldom does this particular type of question emerge; 
especially in the former case, Soviet-era managers are often seen as mere rent-seekers 
unable or unwilling to adapt and essentially asset-stripping their enterprises to get 
rich quickly (e.g. Åslund 2007). This was just as often myth as reality. Using 
a comparison of these two groups—Soviet “Red Directors” (industrial managers, 
especially in heavy industry, the mainstay of the Soviet economy)1 and Argentine 
business elites (business associations representing the interests of various sectors), 
we will try to shed light on the processes and dynamics of radical economic change, 
in order to draw much-needed attention to the actions of those beneath the state 
elite.
THINKING ABOUT CHANGE: ASSUMING DECISION-MAKING
The study of reform contexts in the scholarly literature has tended to focus upon 
dependencies of resources, fi nance, and legitimacy (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; 
Centeno 1994a, 1994b). This follows the current theoretical trend in which the 
environment—be it macroeconomic forces, classes, global fi nance, states, 
organizational fi elds, or a combination—leads automatically to organizational 
decisions, strategies, and structures. Consider two competing explanations for the 
rise of corporate strategies and structures: either the market and fi nancial contexts 
goad rational utility-maximizing managers and owners to take a particular course of 
action; or fi elds of power and meanings induce legitimacy-optimizing managers to 
adopt new strategies and structures (cf. Chandler 1977; Williamson 1985; Roy 1997; 
but see Chandler 1962). Both types of explanation downplay unforeseen outcomes or 
the source of decisions ultimately detrimental to the initial interests of those making 
the decisions. Put differently, the decision-making process that mediates between 
context and outcome is not suffi ciently accounted for. We suggest that managers 
and business elites confronting reform may make decisions that ultimately prove 
harmful or even fatal; apparent lukewarm support for seeming reasons of gain turns 
out to be a bittersweet embrace of defeat. The story of reform encompasses not only 
the politics of implementing and resisting reform, but also the mistakes made by 
those who would be directly affected.
1 This paper considers Soviet and early post-Soviet industrial managers, as they were admini-
strative elites for real production (in contrast to state offi cials in the ministries or the Krem-
lin). We leave out agriculture for reasons of space, although our reading of Barnes 2006 sug-
gests a similar dynamic at work.
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Theory which emphasizes markets (economic arguments) or class and elites 
(political economy) tends to assume a rational-actor model of decision-making. In 
this assumption, actors evaluate the existing context (in this case, context plus 
proposed reforms), calculate present and future costs and benefi ts, and choose 
policies and politicians to support or to obstruct. Reform becomes bargaining 
between political and business elites; its outcome depends on a combination of 
resources, skill at using them, and contingencies (Haggard 1990; Waterbury 1992). In 
the end, the working assumption is that actors calculate what they have, and what 
gains or losses different positions might bring, and from there they act. While this 
model can shed insights into overt supporters, opponents, winners, and losers, it also 
obscures contradictory processes. Furthermore, this model of rationality may not be 
entirely correct (cf. Frank 1990), especially given problems of bounded rationality, 
decision-making heuristics, and cultural categories and practices through which 
actors interpret and act upon perceived environmental “data” (Guillén 1994; Hass 
2007; Fligstein 1990). A reliance on rational choice in institutional and structural 
contexts oversimplifi es how actors come to interpret those very contexts and act 
upon them. A particular problem is reading back into decision-making: we see policies 
and outcomes, and then we read backward to fi gure out just what the initial interests 
and opportunities were. An alternative draws on path dependency: actors continue 
to reproduce previous actions because of existing institutional and structural 
constraints (North 1990; Somers 1998). The problem with path dependency is that it 
can explain why change does not occur, but then faces problems when change actually 
occurs. Relying on irrational managerial decision-making, or illusory rationality at 
the moment of decision-making, can only take us so far. A game-theoretic analysis 
would deepen insights; but game theory is better adapted to making policies 
themselves (e.g. auctions). In addition, while game theory often adds to context, it 
frequently does not contribute anything to the gamers’ heuristics.
One possible direction opens up the decision-making process. In “garbage can 
theory” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972), decisions refl ect inputs from various actors, 
negotiated according to internal organizational politics. Considered as the place 
where decisions are made, organizations are “intendedly rational” (March and Simon 
1958): rather than being based on rational calculation, decisions are the result of 
fairly stable behavior and structured roles and tasks (Perrow 1970). Also, within the 
limits of the organization, decision-makers routinize certain processes, creating 
erroneous interpretative “frameworks” to identify problems and solutions. The rules 
and frames become patterned and normalized deviance, producing failures in the 
system (Vaughan 1996; Eden 2004). The relevance of this is that frames of reference 
of the elites and managers matter. It is a fact that managers and business elites, 
when potentially threatened by liberalizing reforms, may in some circumstances 
choose to go along with those reforms, succumbing in a way which, while it might 
bring short-term gains, may have longer-term dangers. In order to comprehend this 
phenomenon more clearly, we turn to the frames through which Soviet managers and 
Argentine business elites operated. We compare processes of reacting to market-
oriented reforms in Russia and Argentina. Both cases differed along several variables. 
AR TICLES126
Among others these include: degree of preexisting capitalist structure and practices 
(greater in Argentina than in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia); size of the state and 
state repressive capacity and thus the potential to enforce radical reform (greater in 
the USSR than in Argentina), followed by the degree of state weakness (greater as the 
Soviet Union unraveled in the late 1980s); position in the global economy (the USSR 
having more freedom of maneuver); and degree of economic militarization and 
structural deformation. Despite these differing characteristics for each case, through 
the method of contrast we can pinpoint similarities in both countries that account 
for similar decision-making by economic elites: namely, that said elites viewed 
reforms in a similar fashion, as the best answer for the critical economic situation—
although the notion of “crisis” was different in each case. And in both countries 
reforms were not just the result of external pressure, but were supported to varying 
degrees by economic elites.
THE MODEL: STOCHASTIC LEARNING, AMBIGUITY, EXPECTED 
FAILURE, AND EXPECTED AUTONOMY
These puzzling similarities in how managers and business elites acted, embracing 
reforms that ultimately would threaten their very statuses and positions, suggest 
that a pure rational-choice approach to decision making, as often employed, will not 
work to explain the decision-making process followed by these actors. Neither will 
a path-dependent approach, as these economic actors did follow on reforms initially. 
We propose that actors followed a stochastic learning model. Actors were rational, 
but that rationality was bounded within routinized knowledge and three sets of 
perceptions and expectations. Stochastic learning suggests actors anchor decision-
making in what they know through experience, routines, and categories through 
which they fi lter knowledge. Three aspects of their perceptions and information add 
to our story: ambiguity of reform logics; expectations and assumptions from previous 
experiences of reform failure or likely gains; and a narrative of empowerment through 
reforms with regard to state economic hegemony, creating an incentive to support 
reforms to improve managerial or elite autonomy. These latter two factors involved 
interpretations and extrapolations of previous experiences, that is to say, path 
dependency. What links these together is how managers’ and elites’ previous 
experiences with reforms and state policy-making created knowledge and ex-
pectations of how changes would unfold.
KNOWLEDGE, HABITUS, AND STOCHASTIC LEARNING 
The rational choice assumption is that actors calculate individual situations fairly 
objectively (information costs aside) and assess each fresh situation anew. While they 
can learn over time, such learning is primarily the addition of facts or skills; this is 
assumed to be straightforward. We take an alternative approach to help explain the 
paradoxes we raise above: this combines a Bourdieusian logic of knowledge and habitus 
with the “stochastic learning model” (Bush and Mosteller 1955; Macy 1989). First, 
experience builds up in “tool kits” of strategies, inter pretations, and tactics (Swidler 
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1986) that are organized according to relational logics, what Bourdieu calls a habitus 
of expectations and strategies (Bourdieu 1990). This alternative has been applied to 
organizational structures to explain dynamics and timing of successful and frustrated 
change and continuity (cf. Hallett 2003). Organizational and fi eld experiences provide 
not only knowledge of “the business game” but also expectations and a template for 
the construction of strategies for new situations.
This relates to the second half of our alternative, stochastic learning. Perceptions 
of what to expect in new contexts, such as proposed economic reforms, are not based 
on the strictly rational calculation one often meets in economics and some of the 
political science literature. Rather, calculations of future costs and benefi ts are 
shaped by extrapolations from past experiences. These extrapolations are a primary 
source of data and experiences for the actors, and they color the categories and 
logics which actors employ to make sense of current contexts and possible changes. 
This makes seeming irrationalities rational: if past experiences are a result of “bad 
sampling,” irrational strategies seem rational to the actor who has sampled badly. 
This is related to what Tversky and Kahneman (1974) called “anchoring and 
adjustment”: actors take some initial or base estimate (the anchor) about a social 
situation and then adjust it as new data come in. Calculations of a present situation 
are biased by that initial anchor. If past experiences are stored in “tool kits” and 
become part of habitus and stocks of tacit knowledge, contributing to assumptions 
about how the world works that we do not question (Nelson and Winter 1982), then 
actors’ reactions to present situations are biased by the past, unless the present 
situation is clearly demonstrated to be an entirely new challenge.
In sum, rationality is conditioned by heuristics, schemas, and extrapolation from 
past experiences, rather than from purely present contexts—the rational actor has 
historical baggage, i.e. knowledge gained through experience that actors reasonably 
extrapolate. Extrapolation need not be deterministic: reforms that are clear and 
backed up by suffi ciently obvious power (e.g. a ruling party with a sizable electoral 
mandate or the means and will to employ violence) might force actors to consider the 
possibility that past lessons no longer hold. On the other hand, if articulated changes 
are ambiguous and fuzzy, actors are more likely to read the past into the present.
AMBIGUOUS REFORMS
Agents react to proposed changes based on what they see and how it relates to 
what they have seen. Reforms that are not initially clear or are ambiguously proposed 
leave room to read past tendencies into future policies and changes. This is an 
important issue that is skirted around by much political economy theory. New 
institutional economics does posit “information asymmetries” and “information 
costs,” but these assume concrete information to be discovered. Ambiguity suggests 
the existence of more noise than discrete data, and that actors interpret that noise. 
This makes stochastic learning more problematic: when the content of reform is 
unclear or the probability of concrete outcomes is low, actors are more likely to 
anchor perceptions and decisions in past events and experiences and extrapolate 
into the present and future. Thus, ambiguity further increases the likelihood that 
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actors could make a decision that at the moment seems to be in their interests but 
which will ultimately be to their detriment (e.g. the lukewarm or partial embracing 
of reform, rather than taking greater advantage of it or positive action to resist or 
weather it).
Three different sources can be identifi ed in order to understand ambiguity. First, 
reforms were in fact vague and unclear, as political elites proposing reforms might 
not be entirely clear of what they wanted or how to get there, or because reforms 
develop in a piecemeal, even reactive or seat-of-one’s-pants manner. If political 
elites underestimate the degree of reform needed, initial reforms might end up too 
conservative, forcing elites to shift the degree or focus of reforms. The second source 
of ambiguity was the cacophony from the political elite; the elite did not speak of 
reform with the same voice, leaving business elites, managers, and others to guess at 
what they should expect. Finally, the third source was inherent in market-oriented 
reforms and then more diffi cult for reformers or managers to avoid: market reforms, 
and markets themselves, involve uncertainty about outcomes and even processes of 
negotiation and exchange (Centeno 1994b). By providing autonomy, a market 
economy makes it diffi cult to predict with great certainty who will win out in economic 
competition. Unless a wide number of variables are controlled by a small number of 
organizations, some randomness enters the economic context. Despite attempts to 
foresee the future (e.g. through marketing), it is certainly possible for actors to 
misjudge demand, lose important customers for various (including non-economic) 
reasons or face sudden obstacles (acts of God, labor problems, etc). Liberalizing an 
economy involves institutionalizing uncertainty. The urge to anchor and extrapolate 
becomes that much greater.
EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE
If economic elites expect reforms to fail, they are less likely to take them 
seriously or expend time, social capital, and other resources mobilizing to resist or 
co-opt them. The crucial question, then, is why these actors would expect failure. 
Initial ambiguity is not unimportant, but in itself it is neither necessary nor suffi cient. 
Two other factors shape expectations of failure. The fi rst is past experience with 
reforms; the second is perception of the desire, will, and capacity of the political elite 
to enact fundamental changes successfully. If the economic elite sees suffi cient 
continuity in the leadership, and that leadership has a history of imperfect reform, it 
is not irrational for it to expect continued failure. Experiences of previous attempts 
at and failures of reform increase the likelihood that managers and business elites 
will not see reforms as potential challenges. This holds true unless there is a clear 
and powerful initial signal that a reform leadership and its context are suffi ciently 
different from past contexts that “conventional wisdom” will not hold true. If 
managers and business elites expect failure, then it will not be rational to invest in 
adjusting to possible changes resulting from reforms: either they can maneuver and 
make marginal gains, or they will be forced to resume the status quo after inevitable 
failure. As a result, actors are not ready to confront challenges if fundamental change 
does result.
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Expectations of failure might come from several sources: from infi ghting at the 
top, in which case reforms are scuttled or delivered in a confusing condition (we will 
return to the related issue of ambiguity); from the impossibility of implementation 
due to contradiction with other existing core aspects of economic institutions and 
structures; or from resistance by managers, business elites, and other functionaries 
themselves. If such managers and business elites are engaged in passive resistance, 
they might expect reforms to fail, thus reducing perceived incentives to take fuller 
advantage of reforms, in order to brace themselves for greater future shocks, or to 
increase resistance. 
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY FOR AUTONOMY
The discussion thus far suggests overwhelming incentives to do nothing in the 
face of perceived ambiguity and expectations of failure. However, there might be 
incentives to embrace such changes despite these negative perceptions. If an 
arrangement of economic structures and state power constrains economic actors, 
then reforms that initially (even ambiguously) suggest improved autonomy is likely 
to be embraced to some degree. In this respect the logic of neoliberal-style reforms 
creates a dangerous illusion: by potentially promising autonomy, initial stages of 
market or pseudo-market reforms did provide most elites with early gains resulting 
not from economic advantages but from the initial possibility of taking advantage of 
opportunities in defi cit economies (e.g. by raising prices or increasing output). This 
contributed to the illusion of market reforms as inherently positive, even if doomed 
to fail. The experience of the Soviet managers was that the planned economy was 
ineffi cient, and managers did not particularly like having to deal with state ministries 
to alter Plan targets or to obtain defi cit materials (which they did through the shadow 
economy as much as through formal supply). In the Argentine case the crisis of the 
state is key to explaining business strategies: business noticed that the state would 
not be able to continue subsidizing local investments in a context where external 
debt imposed great pressure on fi scal resources. Under these circumstances, the 
reforms, especially the privatization of public enterprises, were seen as an opportunity 
for making new and more lucrative business.
This point is critical to our analysis. So far, the stimulus is for managers and 
business elites to do little when faced with unclear reforms which they believe to be 
doomed to failure. Neoliberal reforms that clearly might promise competition and 
market exit, backed by a regime with the will and power to enforce changes, might 
lead to resistance. Unclear reforms that ultimately might fail, but that also promise 
some degree of autonomy, prompt agents to go along with reforms that ultimately 
might hurt them. How, in this hypothesis, would such reforms be to their detriment? 
The answer is that such damage occurs if, by focusing on smaller gains in autonomy, 
such managers and business elites neglect to set up defensive or offensive strategies 
to guard or expand their positions in case of increasingly radical reform. Put 
differently, these managers will be harmed by the fact that, rather than using reforms 
to enhance their ability to accumulate profi t and reinvest it for further accumulation 
(the driving logic of capitalism according to Marx and Weber), they have used the 
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opportunity not only to gain quick profi t via asset-stripping or playing on the margins 
of law—this is the usual story one hears in discussions, the media, and even 
scholarship (e.g. Kotkin 2001)—but also to increase autonomy. Rather than taking 
risks, engaging with reform and even pushing it further (as other elites, for example 
fi nancial elites and “oligarchs” in post-Soviet Russia, might be expected to do), these 
managers will suffer from focusing on gaining ground for themselves in the 
expectation that when the reforms fail, they will have gained a foothold of additional 
decision-making authority.
TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY? SOVIET MANAGERS,
 ARGENTINE BUSINESS, AND REFORMS
Import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and increasing external debt led 
Argentina to a seemingly inextricable economic muddle by the 1980s. The Soviet 
economy was faced with diffi culties from out-of-date technology, expenses incurred 
in foreign policies, and a growing dependence on petrodollar income; by the 1980s 
the Soviet leadership as well faced growing problems with economic regeneration 
alongside American rearmament. Economic tribulations in Argentina and the Soviet 
Union, from debts and decreasing petrodollars, but also from increasingly rigid state-
centered economic structures, made the perpetuation of the status quo diffi cult. This 
forced political and economic elites to recognize the potential necessity for 
something more than marginal reform. Emerging factions of reformers within the 
regime and state, and within think tanks and other bodies contributing to internal 
(even hidden) discourses, increased the likelihood of at least an attempt at 
fundamental change.
MARKET REFORM FOR THE UNINITIATED: THE SOVIET CASE
As a detailed discussion of Red Directors’ initial conditions and various decisions 
made over this period would make this article unwieldy, we present only a brief 
overview. Two obvious questions are whether Red Directors had real choices and 
whether they were really at risk from increasingly radical reform. As to the fi rst, the 
power of the ministries to compel managers to act as the state wanted was problematic 
to begin with. Brezhnev’s political compromise with managers and various levels of 
state bureaucrats (Bunce 1983; Millar 1985) might not have provided the kind of 
autonomy managers might have in a capitalist system (even where managers are not 
owners). However, it did provide a social contract of sorts, in which managers (like 
other state functionaries) followed the general Party line and did not resist authority 
above them, and were rewarded with relative security in their positions. Industrial 
managers did have to orient decisions and behavior to the Five-Year Plan and monthly 
plans, but they were not punished with bankruptcy (as in capitalism) or coercion (as 
under Stalin). Red Directors could play games of informal or passive resistance, foot-
dragging over Plan fulfi llment or supply and utilizing informal networks to pressure 
higher-up elites in the ministries and the Kremlin to water down various reforms, as 
happened in the 1960s and 1970s (Arnot 1988; Åslund 1989; Nove 1977). By the 
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Gorbachev era, state power was beginning to crumble from reduced surveillance and 
accountability of offi cials, and then from “bank runs” on state resources (Solnick 
1998). Managers did not have a totally free hand to do what they wanted. They still 
had to play a complicated pricing game involving semi-independent daughter fi rms 
and commodities exchanges (the birzha) to fi nd private partners, as we explore more 
fully below. Further, managers had to offer employees the chance to vote on enterprise 
reforms, including turning shop fl oors into semi-independent smaller fi rms or leased 
fi rms (cf. Hass 1998: chapter 4). In addition, Red Directors were not property owners; 
they still answered to the state, even if state representatives or local offi cials were 
silent partners.
Did Red Directors face a real threat from fundamental economic reform? Even at 
that time, optimistic as they might be, industrial managers had evidence that 
fundamental reform would create serious problems. After 1989 and the loss of captive 
clients in Eastern Europe, Red Directors in electronics, metallurgy and the like faced 
reduced exchange and export—and if state subsidies were to decline, this would 
pose an ominous problem. The replacement of the rigid Five-Year Plan with its secure 
state subsidies wth the system of goszakazy (subsidies and planning through concrete 
state purchase orders) increased uncertainty vis-à-vis needed output and likely 
income.2 While many Red Directors articulated (ill-founded) optimism about the 
competitiveness of their goods (cf. Hass 2005), travels abroad or initial imported 
consumer goods should have convinced them of their weak position. Even in 1995, 
two electronics fi rms in Saint Petersburg continued to express pride in their output 
(VCRs, telephones and the like) despite clear inferiority to Western competitors.3 
A competitive market, reduced state support, and an emerging reformist movement 
inside and outside the Communist Party should have been clear signals that Red 
Directors were potentially vulnerable.
What is interesting, therefore, about the Soviet managers is that the predicament 
in which they ultimately found themselves was due to their having taken a middle-of-
the-road approach to reform. In the late 1980s, while younger engineers or Komsomol 
activists were setting up small independent cooperatives to speculate using defi cit 
goods—and reinvesting profi ts into further speculation or small-scale production of 
various goods and services (cf. Gustafson 1999; Listovskaia 1994)—Red Directors were 
playing a muted speculative game for a small profi t, which they then failed to reinvest 
to improve gains or prepare themselves for shocks. Red Directors set up small 
independent fi rms to milk state-owned enterprises, but if the mother enterprise 
2 For a detailed recounting of these problems for one industrial fi rm, see Leningradskii 
stankostroitel’, January 20, 1993:1. Leningradskii stankostroitel’ was the enterprise newspaper 
for the Sverdlov machine-tool enterprise. Considering that its journalists were fairly open in 
reporting worker discontent with and harsh criticisms of management, it is doubtful that 
enterprise journalists would lie about fi nances.
3 This is from Hass’ interviews (Saint Petersburg 1995) with the general director and sales di-
rector of one electronics fi rm, and with assistant directors of sales and marketing at another. 
Enterprise newspapers at both fi rms continued to claim their electronics output was as good 
as imports (cf. Hass 2005 for detail).
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collapsed, they had no fallback position. Consider the use of the birzha (Soviet stock 
exchange). A state-owned enterprise or its daughter would bring materials to the 
birzha, originally obtained at low state-set prices, and exchange them for other goods 
or sell them to private cooperatives or semi-independent daughters of other enterprises 
at higher “market” (negotiated) prices. This provided some profi t, but Red Directors 
stuck with these basic tactics to generate wealth, not to increase value or to increase 
accumulation of wealth. They did not set up stout defenses against reforms even as 
time went on; the best they usually did was to support lobbying groups and parties 
(e.g. Arkadii Vol’skii’s Civic Union) or play a dangerous game of chicken with the state, 
running up debts and delaying restructuring in hopes that the state would rescue them 
to avoid massive unemployment (Dolgopiatova 1995).
While managers in charge of natural resource extracting enterprises had goods 
with more demand outside Russia, managers of enterprises in heavy industry, 
machine-tool production, electronics, textiles and the like had far fewer real assets 
to strip. Technology was old, materials were needed for either production or barter, 
and managers needed to provide their employees with something if they could not 
pay wages. Many of these “Red Directors” ended up in the precarious situation of 
value-destruction and the need to participate in the barter economy to survive 
(Gaddy and Ickes 2002). If a few managers could strip assets to increase wealth 
temporarily, many more found themselves and their enterprises in trouble; eventual 
insider privatization there may have been, but the wealth stolen in the process may 
be as much myth as reality.
AMBIGUOUS REFORMS AND UNCLEAR FUTURES
In hindsight, it appears inevitable that Soviet economic reform would be 
ambiguous. Gorbachev’s own policy desires changed over time, from marginal change, 
to increasingly radical change, to a last-minute stepping back, especially as Boris 
Yeltsin’s star rose higher, legitimating increasing radicalization of political and 
economic reforms. Gorbachev’s Kremlin administration was split over what kinds of 
reforms were necessary (with Gorbachev wavering between camps). The initial 
Gorbachev-Ligachev duumvirate created increasing tensions over the direction of 
reform, with Gorbachev favoring faster reforms and of greater depth than the more 
conservative Ligachev. But after Ligachev was essentially sidelined in 1988, Boris 
Yeltsin began his drive for power. This increased the cacophony at the top, leaving 
Red Directors confused and liberated: it was unclear which faction would eventually 
win out, and the legal confusion gave them de facto autonomy to run enterprises as 
they saw fi t. Finally, market economies have a degree of in-built ambiguity and 
uncertainty; creating a market where it essentially had not existed—had in fact 
been anathema—meant accepting this ambiguity and uncertainty as a core feature 
of the new economy.
In the Soviet Union, the piecemeal style of reforms, from granting more autonomy 
to enterprises in 1988 to liberalization and shock therapy in 1992, meant there was no 
single package with a clear logic of unfolding or defi nite end result that Red Director 
managers could interpret or resist strongly. Industrial managers could engage 
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marginally (not always proactively), until the economy began to unravel and radical 
liberalizing reforms appeared the only way out. Given that Gorbachev’s own ideas on 
policy shifted as initial, cautious reforms went nowhere, and bearing in mind the battles 
he had to fi ght in order to overcome opposition within the higher ranks of the Party and 
state bureaucracy to anything beyond cosmetic reforms, this is no surprise. When 
Mikhail Gorbachev set out to improve the Soviet economy, he picked up Iurii Andropov’s 
reforms to improve labor discipline. This included crackdowns on labor shirking (e.g. 
raiding movie theaters during the day and checking people’s labor books to make sure 
they were not supposed to be at work) and destroying vineyards or reducing vodka 
output to address alcoholism. Gorbachev also introduced khozraschët, enterprise cost-
accounting, and legalized cooperatives within tight restrictions. Both of these minor 
reforms brought little change. As the Soviet economy continued to worsen and 
democratic reforms began to take root in the form of media openness or glasnost’ and 
later in semi-contested elections to the Supreme Soviet, discussions of reforms 
expanded. Gorbachev’s next set of reforms involved giving more decision-making 
autonomy to enterprises, the most important policy being the 1987 law “On Enterprise.” 
Goods and commodity exchanges (birzha) were legalized so that managers could 
formally exchange goods—the hope being that this would reduce supply bottlenecks 
that continuously plagued the Soviet economy. Five-year and monthly plan targets 
were replaced by goszakazy, state purchases. Finally, managers gained more decision-
making autonomy to restructure their own enterprises, e.g. turning shop fl oors into 
fi nancially independent daughter fi rms (cf. Hass 1999).
If anything, managers had been turning toward Gorbachev’s style of reforms, 
which positioned a weakening state, vulnerable to being taken advantage of by 
Soviet enterprises, at the center of the economy (cf. Burawoy and Krotov 1992). 
Several tactics made it fairly clear that managers were taking advantage not only of 
what reforms offered, but also of the ambiguity inherent in those reforms. One clear 
example is how industrial managers often (but not always) used the birzha. The 
original intent of birzha reform was to reduce supply bottlenecks, the thorn of the 
command economy, by allowing managers to come together and exchange needed 
goods without state interference or bureaucratic obfuscation. And in fact some 
participants did use the birzha in this way. One group of entrepreneurs interviewed 
by one of the authors in Russia in 1995 worked at one commodities birzha, exchanging 
timber products for fi rms that needed to unload or obtain such goods. However, state 
law did not stop managers from using the birzha in other ways: here the ambiguity of 
reforms affected how managers (rationally) behaved. One tactic was to use the birzha 
to trade goods obtained cheaply from the state and sell them at higher prices, and 
then pocket some of the gain personally (Sokolin 1997; Kotkin 2001). In this way, 
inherent ambiguities in reforms led industrial managers to perceive a moment at 
which they could gain. Thus they accepted reforms and participated in them, without 
expecting that the reforms would become more radical. These ambiguities did not 
alarm managers until it was too late. Certainly some actions in the birzha or 
cooperatives produced value; enterprise newspapers in Saint Petersburg from this 
period are full of accounts of cooperatives producing consumer goods or providing 
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industrial services that were needed but diffi cult to obtain. But the ambiguity of 
reforms meant that industrial managers could play on the margins of the rules and 
intended reforms—as it was not clear just what, specifi cally, Gorbachev and his 
government intended anyway, or how long they would remain in power as political 
tension began to rise. Too late, these Soviet industrial managers began to understand 
the quandary they would face as 1991 came to a close and as shock therapy took 
effect in 1992. Several Petersburg factory newspapers featured employees’ and 
managers’ worries on the eve of 1992: the previous year had seen the economy and 
polity fragment, and the promised radical reforms by Yeltsin and company now 
aroused trepidation, where earlier Gorbachev-style socialist liberalization from the 
Plan and ministries had brought relief. Initially managers embraced liberalization, 
for it meant dealing directly with purchasers and setting their own agenda for output, 
pricing, and whom to do business with. However, these post-Soviet managers soon 
learned that this freedom applied to others as well; by losing the control of the Plan, 
they had also lost its security, as traditional purchasers decided to go elsewhere or 
stopped buying altogether.4
EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE
The upshot of the stochastic learning model for this concrete case is that if Soviet 
managers expected failure, they would not take seriously possible threats that market 
reforms, in theory, would present—because they had not seen the “theory,” only past 
practices. Future oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii noted this when Gorbachev’s reforms 
began to unfold. Khodorkovskii himself saw the opportunity to use liberalized exchange, 
rubles and hard currency rights from the Komsomol (Party youth organization), yet the 
manager of the research institute where Khodorkovskii worked would not make use of 
entrepreneurial opportunities to make profi t himself, even though he supported 
Khodorkovskii. His rationale: he had seen reforms come and go, and so was hesitant to 
invest personal effort and organizational resources into semi-legal ventures that might 
become illegal before long (Hoffman 2002:107). It is hard to fault Soviet managers for 
such skepticism. While Mikhail Gorbachev’s image was that of a younger, more dynamic 
leader, in contrast to the geriatric conservative wing of the Soviet Communist leadership, 
he nonetheless shared collective leadership with conservatives; in addition, there was 
a history of younger new leaders (Khrushchev or Kosygin) not living up to reform hopes. 
Khrushchev’s economic restructuring was ultimately reversed after it created resistance 
within the Party and state bureaucracy (Nove 1972). The Liberman reforms of the 1960s, 
championed by Aleksei Kosygin, promised to alter the workings of the Plan, by focusing 
on actual use value added to production, i.e. a measure of pseudo-profi t from actual 
use and demand of output. While not “market” in the usual sense, the Liberman reforms 
4 For survey data from managers on this issue, see Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii barometr, issues 
4/1992 and 2/1993. Managers were disturbed that when all managers received market free-
dom to buy and sell, this also meant that others could reject their output—leaving all worse 
off than under the Plan, when at least output was shipped off and paid for.
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promised both opportunity and discipline. However, these reforms tailed off once their 
champion in the Kremlin, Kosygin, lost the competition for power to Leonid Brezhnev. 
One other attempt at reform, the reforms pioneered at the Shchëkino Chemical Combine, 
promised more autonomy in how enterprises could use their wage funds, allowing them 
to keep some profi ts from effi ciency gains. The experiment continued through the 
1970s, but it too faced obstacles from state bureaucrats and from managers of 
enterprises not involved in the experiment, who possibly felt threatened by improved 
effi ciency at the Shchëkino Combine and other participating enterprises. Like the 
earlier reforms, this one too stalled (Arnot 1988). Even discussions of reforms in the 
late Brezhnev era may have added more Plan indicators for managers to account for and 
for Plan bureaucrats to work with—but these ultimately brought little real change to 
the economy (Åslund 1989).
The upshot: support for unclear reform was possible because it was based on vague 
and abstract proposals, and upon the expectation, extrapolated rationally from past 
experiences, that there would ultimately be no fundamental change. Managers believed 
they would not be exposed to market competition and discipline, or the kinds of initial 
sales and fi nancial shocks usually associated with the fi rst phase of radical liberalization 
and privatization. In fact, some analysts claimed managers still expected reforms to 
fail in that fi rst watershed year of 1992. Red Directors reacted to initial hard-budget 
policy by continuing to put in purchase orders and produce outputs despite problems 
of payments and rising debts. Skyrocketing inter-enterprise debt (Ickes and Ryterman 
1992) threatened to bring the suffering Russian economy to a standstill, and on this 
“game of chicken” interpretation, managers would force market reformers to go back to 
the soft budgets of the anti-market Soviet system (Dolgopiatova 1994). Even after 
1992, such expectations persisted. In her study of Red Directors in the early years of 
post-Soviet change, Belianova (1995) found that Red Directors’ attitude toward the 
economic crisis shaped their own reforming strategies vis-à-vis their home enterprises. 
Op timistic managers, who believed reforms might actually reduce the crisis before long, 
were more likely to follow the intention of those reforms and introduce relatively more 
encompassing changes in organizational structure and product output. Those Red 
Directors more pessimistic about the success of reforms and the end of the crisis were 
more likely to play it safe and maintain the structures and product mixes that the 
Soviet era had bequeathed them.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUTONOMY
While Soviet managers had little faith in ultimate fundamental reform and were 
less willing than younger employees and Komsomol activists to pursue entrepreneurial 
activity—even if potentially lucrative and involving speculation for profi t—they were 
nevertheless able to see reforms as an opportunity to gain and, hopefully, hold on to 
some autonomy. There were two sides to this desire for autonomy. The fi rst was that 
managers were agents for the state and were subject to detailed Plan targets and 
procedures. Secondly, many managers realized that the Plan-based economy was 
ineffi cient, and saw that market-based reforms, even if ultimately watered down, could 
free them from the seeming paradox of producing goods whose use they questioned 
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and whose users often they did not know.5 Thus, the possibility of market-like reform 
brought the chance for formal autonomy vis-à-vis the Plan. Interestingly, this dovetailed 
with the informal logic of the Brezhnevite Soviet economy and the “little deal.” 
Members of the Party and state bureaucracy, including managers, had some informal 
autonomy in return for not rocking the boat of the Brezhnev regime (Millar 1985; Bunce 
1983). Brezhnev’s “little deal” should not be interpreted as managerial license, but 
rather as an informal incentive not to challenge the supremacy of the regime. This is 
indicative of the fact that, as noted earlier, managers did realize the ineffi ciencies and 
even irrationalities of the Soviet economy.
Past experiences (cf. Breslauer 1982; Katz 1972) suggested that reform would 
fail, but that managers might be able to take some advantage for quick and marginal 
autonomy. Gorbachev’s reforms of enterprise authority, the legalization (within 
limits) of the cooperative, and the later legalization of the birzha were a demonstration 
that, even if this set of reforms were to fail, managers had an opportunity not seen in 
the 1960s and 1970s for autonomy which implied gains for them; even if the clock 
turned back on such autonomy, it seemed that managers would at least have 
temporary benefi ts. Red Directors’ tactics suggest that they took advantage of 
autonomy, supporting this aspect of reforms only insofar as it did not threaten their 
security, a danger which they did not suspect in the late 1980s, as Gorbachev’s reforms 
evolved. The “On Enterprise” reform and a host of smaller decrees made it possible 
for Red Directors to open cooperatives or transform shop fl oors into semi-independent 
small or leased fi rms; these groups had the opportunity to produce beyond the Plan 
and goszakazy for profi t (often for other cooperatives and small fi rms). A case in 
point was Leningrad’s (Saint Petersburg’s) Leningrad Metal Factory: a cautious 
introduction of autonomy to cooperatives was rescinded; instead, the enterprise’s 
managers turned some shop fl oors into “small fi rms” (malye predpriiatiia) under 
managerial control.6 The use of the birzha to obtain needed defi cit materials as well 
as to improve profi t for cooperatives and managers has been discussed. This was an 
exercise in new-found managerial autonomy gained by playing the margins of 
legality. Another example of managers grasping autonomy was voluntary associations. 
These were groups of fi rms in related production and often from the same ministry or 
local-level glavk (regional equivalent of a ministry). After the end of the Plan 
structure and the introduction of goszakazy, supply bottlenecks and fi nancing became 
worse. To support their enterprises fi nancially and materially, and thus to support 
their own positions, Red Directors often engaged suppliers and partners directly, 
5 This comes from interviews Hass conducted at twenty Petersburg electronics and industrial 
enterprises in 1994–95. All mentioned Plan irrationalities, and the fact that reforms freed 
them from producing output that often had no real value other than legitimating the Plan. 
(They were all also critical of Yeltsin for reducing state subsidies and introducing problem-
atic or unjust privatization, and they were critical of younger entrepreneurs for becoming 
wealthy via “speculation” rather than by adding value productively.)
6 The history comes from accounts and interviews published in the Leningrad Metal Factory 
enterprise newspaper Turbostroitel’ in 1989–1992.
G AS TÓN J.  BELTRÁN,  JEFFREY K.  HASS.  ILLUSIONS OF  MARKET  PARADISE. . . 137
rather than through the medium of the ministries.7 This provided several advantages 
to managers vis-à-vis autonomy. Red Directors were now dealing directly with supply 
partners, not through the state. By the 1990s, younger experts at these voluntary 
associations would organize lobbying efforts and analyze strategies for improving 
sales and seeking fi nance. For example, a Petersburg voluntary association for major 
bread fi rms helped those member fi rms coordinate supply for production and mediate 
disputes; in the early 1990s the association hired newly-trained experts in fi nance or 
with experience in supply and exchange to organize privatization plans and to begin 
marketing projects.8
Voluntary associations did help member fi rms survive, but they also allowed 
member managers to hold the illusion that they could weather the storm and emerge 
safe and healthy within a few years. Some associations created pocket banks—banks 
created with association money and attracting deposits by citizens and private fi rms. 
However, by 1993 some pocket banks were having trouble supporting their associations 
or were demanding higher interest rates for loans to their very founders.9 Further, 
these associations kept member managers locked into their previous production, 
which often became value-destroying, especially for heavy machinery and electronics. 
The voluntary associations, which initially cemented newly-gained autonomy from 
direct state control, trapped managers into producing old goods for each other. 
Contrast this with younger fi nancial elites and oligarchs in the early 1990s. These 
fi nancial entrepreneurs made fortunes speculating with defi cit goods or in currency; 
unlike Red Directors, they took full advantage of liberalization to trade in whatever 
they could, reinvesting some of their profi ts into further exchange or even production. 
Their empires were increasingly diversifi ed, refl ecting a logic not of grabbing some 
initial autonomy and defending it fi ercely, but of taking advantage of changes and 
investing wherever money might be made (cf. Starodubrovskaia 1995; Pappe et al. 
1997; Gorbatova 1995; Prokop 1995). In contrast to Red Directors, these younger 
entrepreneurs proactively engaged reforms.
We do not want to suggest that Soviet industrial managers were ecstatic about 
the possibility of market-style reforms of any shade. Confronted with a context in 
which they had to generate their own sources of income as state subsidies dried up 
or “disappeared,” managers discovered they did not always have the necessary human 
capital or practices to adjust (Hass 2005). However, they had embraced possibilities 
for autonomy in the birzha and enterprise reform. Paradoxically, this occurred through 
no organized resistance; they participated in carrying out Gorbachev’s reforms, 
taking autonomy but resisting accountability—a practice that continued into the 
7 Managers at electronics and lathe-making fi rms in Saint Petersburg (interviewed by Hass in 
1995) noted that they often knew whom they were supplying or being supplied by.
8 These data came from Hass’s interviews with bread enterprise managers and the head of mar-
keting for the Petersburg association of bread-makers.
9 To use the example of the Sverdlov machine-tool enterprise: managers here helped create 
pocket banks to help them survive initial fi nancial turbulence. But before long, the pocket 
bank was demanding higher interest rates (Leningradskii stankostroitel’, September 9, 1992:1, 
and July 13, 1993:1).
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1990s, as managers used networks and barter to avoid bankruptcy and keep their 
value-destroying enterprises alive (Gaddy and Ickes 2002).10 In other words, they 
moved forward on aspects of reform that would ultimately haunt them. 
BUSINESS ELITES DIG THEIR OWN GRAVE: 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA
The rationale of the process in which Argentine business elites were engaged was 
different, in many ways, from the one faced by Soviet managers in the same period. 
Firstly and most obviously, Soviet reforms ended in the creation of a market economy 
after decades of the socialist experience; the creation of new institutions, economic 
rules, and actors was the result of the transformation we analyze here. In Argentina, 
change was relatively limited: the move was from a state-oriented strategy of 
development based on an internal market protected by high tariff barriers, to a more 
open economy with, at least in theory, a reduced level of state intervention. 11 Secondly, 
the actors of the drama were conceptually different: the key actors in Argentina were 
not managers of state-owned enterprises but real capitalists, businessmen who had 
internalized the rules and logic of the capitalist market. They had, then, a different 
relation with the state and with the market, and they made their projections about the 
consequences of the reforms on a different basis. Finally, partly as a result of their 
different historical development, Argentine businessmen played a more active role 
than Soviet managers in the process of reforms. In fact, through their business 
associations, this group was one of the main promoters of the transformation. In sum, 
the Soviet and Argentine experiences differed in terms of the position of business 
within the two economies, as well as in the political dynamics at play. Yet paradoxically, 
the same basic forces and processes were at work in the USSR and in Argentina. Like 
Soviet managers, Argentine business elites were oriented toward rules and frameworks 
to anchor decision-making: elucidating these provides clues as to why they agreed 
with and initially even pushed market-oriented policies.
Argentine business support of the reforms holds another paradox: the most 
prominent local businessmen had developed under conditions of state protection. 
10 This leads to a Prisoners’ Dilemma moment: autonomy without accountability threatens such 
behavior as asset-stripping or rent-seeking and allows the continuation of value-destroying 
practices or incompetences. All this can lead to greater economic losses or ineffi ciencies, deep-
ening crisis, and the increasing probability that reforms would become yet more radical.
11 As the aim here was to analyze the political actions of a business through the positions 
 adopted by its associations in public space, our data mainly comes from archival research. We 
considered the “offi cial” publications of the business associations (such as annual reports, 
journals, and speeches) as indicators of the strategic positions adopted by each of them in 
the political fi eld. We also took into account the positions adopted by the chairmen of the 
associations in the press, in order to capture discrepancies and tensions within the organiza-
tions. Archival research in newspapers also provided us with a description and characteriza-
tion of the concrete political actions followed by the business—from block-outs to meetings 
with government offi cials. Finally, we considered debates and positions expressed in the spe-
cialized press (such as the journals Mercado and Apertura) as a gateway to communication 
strategies developed within the fi eld.
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Even more strikingly, during the 1970s the military government had tried out a series 
of “liberal” policies—similar to those introduced in the 1990s—that had damaged 
important fractions of business. Thus, by the beginning of the 1980s, when the new 
democratic government arrived in power, these fractions were far from supportive of, 
let alone demanding, market reforms. 12 In 1981, the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) 
argued that
whereas it was previously believed that everything can be solved by the market 
alone, we have discovered that the process of purifying and strengthening the 
productive system has resulted in a situation in which many effi cient fi rms are 
dying or have already died (UIA 1981).
The positions of the industrialists were not theoretical: due to new levels of 
competition and lack of credit, many of them had faced bankruptcy in the previous 
years. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, most fractions of Argentine business 
had adopted a shared diagnosis: even those affected by the opening of the economy 
during the 1970s agreed to demand market reforms.13
How can this change in business positions be explained? Political dynamics, 
government strategies, ideological frameworks, and type of business organization 
are all factors that help to understand this shift (Beltrán 2007). The last of these 
reasons is also key to understanding the business confi guration in Argentina which, 
in fact, displayed a much more complex spectrum than the Soviet one. Generally, 
the fi eld of Argentine business was characterized by diversity and heterogeneity 
among its members. Differences concerned size, sector of activity, target markets, 
type of production (diversifi ed or specialized), as well as cultural traditions and 
political resources (Acuña 1995; Birle 1997; Viguera 2000). All these differences 
helped create diverse preferences and were the basis of the different logics of 
political action followed by each fraction. Diversity can be seen even within the 
aggregates we are considering here, i.e. the business associations. In fact, the 
existence of an extended number of associations is a strong indicator of the level 
of heterogeneity of their interests.14 Business heterogeneity had been crucial to the 
12 During the 1970s, the military government propelled a series of neoliberal economic reforms, 
e.g. opening the economy and deregulating the fi nancial system. These brought more harm 
than good. As a result, when the new democratic government arrived in 1984, many business 
elites (especially in manufacturing) were critical of liberal theory.
13 While some were critical, traditionally liberal business associations, e.g. the Argentine Ru-
ral Society and Argentine Chambers of Commerce, insisted that the liberal model had not 
been exhausted, and all trouble came from state intervention. These arguments assume 
that the critical situation of the early 1980s was due not to a failure of liberalism but to 
a return of the old model. Liberalism—or neoliberalism—was plausible as a “new,” untried 
alternative.
14 The main business organizations (excluding sectoral and regional ones) are: the Argentine 
Industrial Union (founded in 1887), the General Confederation of Industry (1951), the Argen-
tine Industry Council (1982), the Argentine Rural Society (1866), the Argentine Agrarian Fed-
eration (1912), the Argentine Rural Confederation (1942), the Agricultural Inter-Cooperative 
Confederation (1956), the Argentine Chamber of Construction (1936), the Argentine Union of 
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political dynamics of the country during the second half of the 20th century, as 
some scholars have suggested (Portantiero 1977, Rouquié 1982).Therefore, by the 
end of the 1980s, what was new in the Argentine political scenario was that all 
business sectors, in spite of their historical differences, agreed on the same project: 
the transformation of the state.
AMBIGUOUS REFORMS AND UNCLEAR FUTURES
As in the USSR, vagueness and ambiguity played a critical role in the adoption 
and support of Argentine market reforms, although ambiguity had a different 
meaning in each case. In contrast to Soviet managers, Argentine business leaders 
considered the opening of the economy not as a completely new phenomenon but 
as something that had been tried in the past decade. Ambiguity was not connected, 
then, to the unfamiliarity of the market as a form of social organization, nor to the 
policies required to create these unknown markets quickly. Instead, ambiguity 
arose from a combination of factors, including the fragmentation of the business 
fi eld and the vagueness of the liberal reform proposals. Out of this process, the 
business fi eld emerged in a unique position, promoting and legitimizing the reforms 
introduced during the 1990s. This common position made sense, however, in a 
context where different factors came together.
In the fi rst place, liberal positions were part of an old tradition within the 
business fi eld. In fact, some of the most powerful fractions had historically been 
identifi ed with economic liberalism. Among these fractions were some powerful 
exporters, members of the banking system, and the infl uential rural sector, grouped 
in the Sociedad Rural Argentina. For them, state intervention had led to cyclical 
economic crises and had isolated the country from the rest of the world. Over the 
three previous decades, their interests had clashed with populist-oriented policies 
from democratic governments, and they had therefore supported coups d’état and 
military regimes (Rouquié 1982; O’Donnell 1973).15 Although they had a critical view 
of state intervention, they had obtained gains from their close connections with the 
government and believed that bargaining and confrontation with the state were key 
to constructing repertoires of political action (Tilly 1995).
Construction (1985), the Argentine Chamber of Commerce (1924), the Argentine Commerce 
Union (1981), the Association of Banks of the Argentine Republic (1919), the Argentine Banks 
Association (1972), the General Economic Confederation (1953), and the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange (1854).
15 In Latin America, Keynesianism acquired two forms: developmentalism and national populism. 
Developmentalists argued that the primary goal was production and growth, not income re-
distribution. Their solution involved intense vertical import-substituting industrialization, 
focusing on a high-priority basic industrial sector; rapid capital accumulation emphasizing 
foreign investment; and state involvement to channel private initiatives. National populism 
favored domestic industry over foreign industry. The preference for national capital rein-
forced the emphasis on small-scale industry. This camp also advocated greater state involve-
ment in production. Inherited from the fi rst Peronist party, national populism was highly 
 infl uential in Argentina during the second half of the 20th century (see Sikkink 1991).
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The political strategy of Alfonsín’s government (1984-89) was also critical in 
defi ning the positions of business during this decade. As the government believed 
that political dynamics were more important than the economy, Alfonsín sought to 
create an isolated state bureaucracy, trying to put some distance between the state 
and both business and trade unions (Acuña 1995; Birle 1997; Botto 1999; Schvarzer 
and Sidicaro 1987). From the business perspective, this initial distance set the state 
up as the political adversary of capital (Schmitt 1999). Besides that, the government 
not only opposed liberal economic ideas but also reinforced state intervention, in 
particular by controlling prices in order to get infl ation under control. Thus, the 
government played a game of opposition to business that alienated most business 
associations.16 As early as 1985, the industrialists and the ruralists agreed on defi ning 
the state as “oppressive,” arguing that reality had shown that “only private capitalism 
can set the direction of the political economy” (El bimestre político y económico 
17/1984). Business became even more critical insofar as the economic crisis spiraled 
out of state control by the end of the decade, most visibly demonstrated by declining 
GDP and rising foreign debt, which made up 20 percent of GDP by the end of the 
military regime, and by high levels of infl ation (Madisson 1989; INDEC 1986). This 
situation, and the identifi cation of the crisis with state intervention, convinced even 
businesses previously critical of liberalism that the state had to be reformed.
Consensus also arose as a result of the political dynamics. As business elites 
confronted the state, their agreement on key issues contributed to coordinating 
actions in spite of diversity of interests. Most of the business sector saw the possibility 
of coordinated actions as the condition for obtaining favorable decisions from 
a government perceived as the political adversary. Some aggregations of interests 
among business leaders emerged throughout the decade, contributing to the idea of 
business as a monolithic block without inherent differences—as in the case of the 
G17 (1987), the G11 (1985), and the G8 (1987). These groupings, composed of multiple 
sector associations, sought to fi nd a unifi ed position vis-à-vis the state.
Ideological positions also played an important role in defi ning business preferences 
regarding the reforms, and contributed to the vagueness which the reforms acquired in 
Argentina. To this extent, the existence of a set of economists with strong links both to 
local businesses and international fi nancial organizations was a precondition for 
legitimating liberal economic ideas (Babb 2002; Bockman and Eyal 2002).17 In the 
16 The new government emphasized the importance of politics over the economy. It also tried to 
re-edit a set of policies that the same party applied when it took offi ce during the 1960s. This 
view on politics and the economy included the aim to subordinate and discipline local 
 business to the government goals. However, after a decade of economic liberalization, this 
new stage of state intervention collided with business’s interests, particularly those of the 
most traditional factions. Policies such as price control (as a tool to reduce infl ation), more 
aggressive tax policies (particularly export rights) and the attempt to make decisions show-
ing a greater state autonomy than in the past caused business grouping to mobilize to con-
front the new administration (Schvarzer and Sidicaro 1987).
17 Working at think tanks such as Fundación Mediterránea, Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos 
de Argentina and Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, these econo-
mists presented the liberal project as neutral, objective, and the opposite of “populism” (He-
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context of the economic and institutional crises, and given the perception that the 
state was not able to control the most important variables, neoliberal ideas made sense 
to most Argentine business elites, including the most powerful and entrenched ones. 
By the end of the decade these ideas had gained international legitimacy.18 Argentine 
economists were in charge of translating global ideologies into the local context. At 
the same time they were in charge of counseling both private and public bureaucracies, 
offering frameworks for strategic decision-making (Dezalay and Garth 2002; Beltrán 
2005).
Given the characteristics of Argentine business and the complexity of the process 
through which agreement was reached, the idea of consensus throughout the business 
community deserves special scrutiny. What characterized the agreement was the 
ambiguity and vagueness of the proposals supported by the business community.
Argentine businesses did agree on a set of basic and unquestionable ideas: state 
intervention as the cause of the crisis and infl ation; the end of the state-based 
strategy of development; the need to transform the state by reducing its scope and 
functions; the idea of the market as the best way to organize social relations, 
distribute resources, and generate profi t; and the need to be integrated into the 
global economy. Privatization, market deregulation, and (vaguely defi ned) 
liberalization and opening of the economy were signaled as reforms the government 
should adopt (Beltrán 2005). However, beyond these common and vaguely defi ned 
sentiments, differences prevailed regarding the best ways to transform these ideas 
into actual policies. Using the terminology of Hirschman (1977), the agreement 
constituted a “tactical dimension”: a discourse composed of implicit contents never 
fully scrutinized. In other word, the specifi c steps to be followed, the precise features 
of the reforms, and their consequences for each sector were never seriously discussed. 
The ambiguity implicit in the consensus is crucial to any explanation of the scope 
and shape reforms would take in forthcoming years. In fact, each business sector had 
different ideas about what the reforms should imply. The Sociedad Rural Argentina 
expected that reforms would take the country back to a “golden age” of the agro-
export model of the early 20th century; a reduced public defi cit would mean elimination 
of taxes (SRA 1987). More pragmatically, and with an eye on fi nancial globalization, 
the Asociación de Bancos Argentinos sustained the argument that the state should be 
reformed in order to eliminate restrictions on the arrival of fi nancial capital and 
investments—access to global markets would allow the development of a local 
fi nancial system in the country. For the Unión Industrial Argentina, state transformation 
meant an impulse to the benefi t of industrial production and manufactured goods 
redia 2006). They differentiated themselves from the “old” generation of “liberal” economists 
who were part of the traditional elite. Most of them belonged to the middle class and had 
PhDs from American or British universities (Babb 2002; Centeno and Silva 1996). They were 
highly infl uential in introducing neoliberalism into Argentina.
18 Peter Hall (1989:10) argues that “the persuasiveness of a new set of economic ideas […] 
depends not simply on the ideas themselves but on the way in which they fi t with other exist-
ing ideas, including the pertinent array of existing economic theories, recognized puzzles, 
and observations of the contemporary economic world.”
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exports. To this group, defi cit reduction should be translated into active policies for 
industrial development; for them, “a reduction of the restriction on access to 
imported goods would be acceptable under certain conditions” that included some 
specifi c forms of state protection (UIA 1987).
Diverse interpretations of reforms reveal the existence of opposite interests 
among business sectors. Such differences were displayed more clearly every time the 
government advanced toward concrete political reforms (Beltrán 2007). In the 1980s 
internal differences emerged when Alfonsín’s government sought to privatize public 
enterprises.19 Yet, despite these contrasting visions, business leaders publicly spoke 
with a relatively unifi ed voice.20
The 1980s ended abruptly. In the middle of a social and institutional crisis and 
hounded by hyperinfl ation (3,080 percent by 1989), Alfonsín resigned before the end 
of his term after the election was won by the Peronist Carlos Menem (Botto 1999; 
Sidicaro 2002). The new government assumed power in 1989 and initiated reforms at 
an amazingly fast pace: the most important reforms were impemented in no more 
than three years. Support from liberal circles and business was crucial to the adoption 
of the reforms.21 Menem assumed that business leaders’ diagnosis was valid and soon 
tried to create coalitions in order to assure his government’s continuity.
However, once concrete reforms began, differences arose within business.22 At 
this stage it became clear that the consensus generated in the previous years had its 
limits. During the fi rst years of Menem’s government, these differences were crucial 
19 In 1986, and then in 1987, the government tried to privatize important public enterprises, 
including communications and airlines. Initiatives failed because local businesses were not 
yet interested in participating and because they expected greater participation, as eventu-
ally happened in the 1990s.
20 The G8 was the most infl uential and lasting of the fourth-degree business groupings. An in-
formal association that groups the eight more important business groupings, it was made up 
of the Argentine Industrial Union, the Argentine Rural Society, the Argentine Chamber of 
Construction, the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Banks of the Argentine 
Republic, the Argentine Banks Association, and the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. Formed 
in 1987, it wielded great infl uence in the last years of the Alfonsín government. In the 1990s 
it supported general economic reform. Once the negative effects of the reforms became evi-
dent, internal differences emerged.
21 This contrasts with the Chilean experience—a case of early neoliberalization imposed by 
force under a dictatorship (Barret 1985)—and with the Brazilian one—a slow and late trans-
formation with some degree of business opposition until the mid-1990s (Diniz 1991; Boschi 
1991; Evans 1992; Kingstone 1999).
22 These differences can be deduced not only from discourse but also from statistic evidence. 
The Encuesta a Grandes Empresas of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and 
various business performance indexes (e.g. those published in Mercado) show far-reaching 
economic change in the 1990s. In aggregated terms, the internationalization of the economy 
meant that local businesses lost their positions (both economically and politically). This pro-
cess was uneven, but it was present across all sectors of activity, intensifying the differences. 
Regarding the differences among sectors, data from the Ministry of the Economy shows a pro-
cess of re-primarization of the economy and a development of the fi nance sector, accompa-
nied by a decline in the manufacturing industry.
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for the dynamics of the political economy. In contrast to the previous decade, it was 
more diffi cult for business leaders to coordinate their actions. As the government 
was introducing policies that were aligned with their demands, it became more and 
more diffi cult for those who were being harmed to ask for a change in political 
orientation. Therefore, differences coexisted with a general agreement with the 
“orientation” of the new government. For the Argentine Rural Society, for instance, 
the fi rst economic plan of Menem’s administration included “the most important 
aspirations: to reach fi scal balance, eliminating the public defi cit, in order to stop 
infl ation” (SRA 1989). The industrialists, at the same time, supported the government’s 
proposal to “reduce the state, deregulate, free the markets, […] and open up 
opportunities for creative private initiative” (UIA 1989).
Menem’s choice for his fi rst Minister of the Economy sent a clear, strong signal 
to the business community: the position was fi lled with a member of the economic 
group Bunge & Born, one of the more traditional and powerful Argentine holdings. 
The arrival of the new minister was interpreted as an alliance between the government 
and the most powerful business sectors, implying that some traditional associations 
(e.g. the Unión Industrial Argentina) had been sidelined (Viguera 2000). Therefore, 
once “businessmen” were in decision-making positions, it became clear that the 
apparent consensus masked different and diverse contents. Initial measures were 
aimed at structural adjustment, increasing tariffs, and freezing prices and salaries to 
stop infl ation. However, diffi culties in controlling infl ation and confl icts with diverse 
business sectors led the minister to resign.
Between 1989 and 1991, the implementation of the reforms followed a complex 
path of confl ict and bargaining between the government and different business 
sectors. Once reforms were underway, each sector tried to negotiate to improve its 
position under the new circumstances. What was now clear was that reforms 
discriminated between winners and losers and that the ambiguous consensus of the 
previous decade had reached an end. In a scenario where multiple parameters had 
been modifi ed at the same time, many businesses benefi ted from certain policies but 
were harmed by others (Schneider 2005). The opening of the economy, the reduction 
of subsidies, the increasing cost of credit, and the change in relative prices had an 
asymmetrical impact upon each sector and even within each of those sectors.
Menem’s government alternated attempts at coalition-building with efforts to 
impose discipline on business. The rhythm and direction of the reforms was defi ned 
through a complex bargaining process between government and business. Privatization 
was crucial to generating support and consensus on the reforms, since it was the main 
source of entrepreneurs’ initial gains (Gerchunoff et al. 1992). The reduction of import 
barriers, on the other hand, became a focus of criticism. Thus, the vague content of the 
reforms helped them to be implemented initially, and the transformations made in this 
period had long-term effects both on the economic system and the economic players. 
During the fi rst year some of those who were being harmed by the new situation became 
critical of the policies, but had no capacity to articulate their demands and produce 
effective and coordinated political action. This controversial period was soon ended by 
the passage of the Convertibility Law in 1991. After that, the reforms initiated in the 
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context of the hyperinfl ation crisis were expanded: privatization, deregulation, and the 
opening of the economy became more organic and systematic (Toulan and Guillén 
1997), creating new conditions for future political activity by business.23 For the 
following decade, the business groupings’ capacity to voice their positions, as well as 
their political options, were framed by a pro-market view that limited opportunities to 
articulate alternatives, particularly for those who were considered the losers of this 
process.
EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE
The rationale followed by Argentine business has important points of contact 
with the Soviet case, but there are also signifi cant differences. While Soviet managers 
suspected that reforms would not take deep roots and amount to much change, 
Argentine business elites shared a different idea of what “failure” meant. Its meaning 
in the late 1980s was connected, fi rst of all, with the assumption that the state 
interventionist model of development had reached a critical point and that it was 
necessary to advance toward a new one. This idea was reinforced by persistent 
infl ation and was confi rmed by hyperinfl ation in 1989. The argument was made that 
the ISI model had been exhausted since the early 1970s and that state-led 
development had failed. What this did not take into account was that the model had 
suffered from policies introduced by the military and their minister for the economy, 
José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, in the second half of the decade (Basualdo et al. 1990; 
Rodrik 1998). Although for some types of business, the model clearly no longer 
worked, this was not true for every sector. Based on the perceived failure of ISI, in the 
1980s entrepreneurs assumed that the introduction of liberal reforms was the best 
option at hand. Although vagueness and ambiguity were key factors, Argentine 
business leaders did not act only under unknown conditions; they also calculated 
rationally the possible results of reforms and how they would affect them.
The rationale of the expectations of business elites was infl uenced by historical 
experience and their relations with the state. First, they read accurately that the 
state was in a critical economic position. External indebtedness, the lack of 
investment, the lack of capacity to collect taxes, and infl ation had put the state in 
a position that constrained its capacity to answer their demands. Business elites 
concluded then that the state could not subsidize them as it had done in the past.24 
According to this reasoning, structural change meant new opportunities, at least 
for some—those with a chance to profi t from privatizations.25 This helps understand 
23 The program established a fi xed exchange rate and limited the Central Bank to acting as 
a currency board. Furthermore, the tax system was reformed, introducing a single value-added 
tax on all goods and services and making this tax the state’s main source of income. The law 
also included a set of measures to fi ght tax evasion and prohibited contract indexation.
24 At the end of the military government, foreign debt reached $46 billion. Between 1976 and 
1983, the debt grew by 364 percent, representing 20 percent of GNP and 160 percent of an-
nual exports (Ministerio de economía (www.mecon.gov.ar); INDEC 1986).
25 During the 1990s, some of the most powerful economic groups participated in privatizations. 
In most cases, public enterprises were bought by a consortium composed of international 
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the apparent paradox that most businesses that supported reforms and demanded 
less state intervention had developed as capitalists under the protection—and 
using the subsidies—of the state (Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Durand 1994; Diniz 
2000).
There was a second argument that appealed to a wider spectrum of 
entrepreneurs: based on history, business elites expected a change in “forms” of 
state protection, but not a demise of state protection itself. This turned out to be 
correct, but state protection acquired a narrower meaning than business elites 
expected. In other words, Argentine business perceived that if things went wrong, 
the state would bail them out as it had done before.26 This is the reason why, in 
spite of being a hetero geneous fi eld, most business sectors visualized themselves 
as “winners” of the future transformation: for them, risks would eventually be 
reduced by state action.
In fact, Argentine business elites had good reason to believe that the state 
would rescue them. First, Argentine capitalism developed through the state. 
Subsidization, market protection, and profi table state contracts had been the means 
employed by the most powerful businesses to evolve (Azpiazu et al. 1986; Sabato 
1988; Schvarzer 1991). Furthermore, the state had emerged from various critical 
situations in the past, “saving” business interests: a few years earlier, the state had 
nationalized debts which the private sector had acquired from international banks 
during the military government.27
For businesses, the probability of state support was higher under liberal 
governments than during Keynesian/populist periods. Moving into liberal reforms 
promised to put them in a better position for bargaining with the state. In their 
reasoning, the more apparently capitalist the model, the more the state would need 
to negotiate with owners of capital—and so business elites would have a key role 
under the new rules and be in a better position vis-à-vis the state (Viguera 2000, 
Kingstone 1999).
It was not until the reforms started to be introduced in the 1990s that the actual 
costs of change became apparent. The effects of the reforms, however, were very 
different from what some of their supporters had expected. Although some individual 
businesses were able to make adjustments to become more competitive, many—
particularly small and medium-size manufacturing fi rms—went bankrupt. With the 
fi rms (with market know-how and technical capacity), a foreign investor (fi nancial institu-
tions such as Citi Bank, which held debt bonds that the government accepted at their nominal 
value) and local businesses. 
26 When the “debt crisis” hit most Latin American countries in the early 1980s, many Argentine 
businesses were “saved” by the state. Through different mechanisms, the state assumed debt 
taken on by the private sector, which at this point represented almost half of total foreign 
debt (Basualdo 1988).
27 Private debt was about 50% of total debt (Basualdo 1988). The military took the place of the 
private debtors in negotiations with the international creditors and itself became the credi-
tor to local business. Later, infl ation considerably reduced private debt, and the process end-
ed through a transfer of debt from private debtors to the state.
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reduction of tariff barriers, powerful competitors entered the market, affecting the 
position of even some of the most powerful local grupos (Basualdo 2006; Kosacoff 
1998; Schorr 2004; Schvarzer 2001; Rapoport 2005). Increasing competition and 
diffi cult (and expensive) access to credit favored concentration and foreignization of 
the economy (Chudnovsky and López 1998; Kosacoff 1998). The lack of state 
protection affected all sectors of the economy, including the manufacturing industry, 
food producers, and fi nance. Both the manufacturing industry and the rural sector 
grew less than average during the 1990s, while the service sector grew more than 
average (Basualdo 2006). Many industries, including electronics, machinery and 
others such as shoes and textiles reduced their production, and a signifi cant number 
of fi rms closed. In this context, the strategy of most industrialists was “defensive” 
(Schvarzer 2001; Kosacoff 1998).28
In sum, Argentine business leaders did not necessarily believe that the project 
as a whole would fail. What they expected was that the state would not be able to 
discipline them. In addition, they expected be able to draw profi t from the new 
situation and that if, in the end, something went wrong, the state would act in their 
interests. From the viewpoint of the Argentine business elites, no matter what the 
characteristics of the model were to have been, the theoretical chance to win was 
always there.
OPPORTUNITY FOR AUTONOMY
As in the USSR, reforms promised Argentine business elites the possibility to 
increase their autonomy from the state. This view was founded on the belief that 
under a liberal-oriented government, business leaders would be in a better position 
to obtain responses to their demands. However, autonomy had different meanings. 
First of all, the Argentine state had left more room for autonomy than had the Soviet 
state. Secondly, owners usually have more room to maneuver than managers. 
Therefore Argentine owners did not perceive that they were limited in their decision-
making per se (as managers did). For them, greater autonomy from the state meant 
the opportunity to do new and more lucrative business without state control of their 
activities and with a chance to reduce tax payments to a minimum.
Therefore, autonomy in Argentina represented an opportunity to reduce 
economic regulation. While Soviet managers sought to reduce state regulation of 
their activities, in the absence of private property even small steps toward more 
autonomy carried greater weight than in Argentina. Here, business shared the 
perception that the crisis was caused by state interventionism; deregulation emerged 
both as solution for the economy as a whole and an opportunity to increase business 
maneuverability and profi tability. For the Argentine Construction Chamber (1990), 
28 Even big companies were affected differently by the reforms. Basualdo (2006) distinguishes 
between those that improved their positions in the 1990s (Pérez Companc, Loma Negra, 
 SOCMA, Werthein, Acindar, Clarín, Techint), those that disappeared (Bonafi de, FV-Canteras 
Cerro Negro, Noel, Aceros Bragado, Astilleros Alianza, Scholnik. Celulosa Argentina), and those 
that lost ground (Bunge & Born, Bridas, Garovaglio y Zorraquín).
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“the defi cit, the overwhelming state, and the budget imbalances formed a scenario 
that has brought the country to economic and social chaos.”
History played a key role in the generation of this view: for decades, liberal 
business sectors had sustained the notion that state intervention represented the 
intrusion of the government into private issues. The critique of interventionism and 
the promise of greater autonomy had been discussed within the business fi eld for the 
greater part of the 20th century. These sectors had enjoyed greater autonomy under 
military governments than under democratic ones (Acuña 1995; Birle 1997). 
Nevertheless, the dictatorship that began in 1976 and ended in 1983 had changed 
the equation: the military closed most channels of communication with civil society, 
including business organizations—the Unión Industrial Argentina is a paradigmatic 
case. It is fair to say that during this period the state kept a distance from most 
businesses, with the exception of some privileged big business groups.29 The military 
became “unpredictable” (Acuña 1995).
In addition to the experience of the dictatorship, during the fi rst years of the 
Alfonsín administration business associations argued that the state left no room for 
their initiatives and that retreat from the economy was necessary to free up 
investment capacity. The Argentine Industrial Union argued that the most dynamic 
private sectors of Argentine society “had suffered excessive extractions and were 
affected in their capacity to generate wealth for the economy” (UIA 1986). Ambiguous 
neoliberal reforms in Argentina were doubly attractive to the business elite: they 
promised increased autonomy vis-à-vis the state and society. This last aspect of 
autonomy presents an interesting contrast with the Soviet case. While formal 
ideology stressed working-class hegemony through the Communist Party and socialist 
state, Soviet trade unions were included in the overall structure of state power and 
were not a vehicle for mobilization against managers (Rutland 1990). This would 
push Argentine business elites toward neoliberal reform, which was inherently hostile 
to organized labor. However, Argentine business elites were not under the same 
degree of control as Soviet managers; in this aspect, Soviet managers would be more 
attracted to market-style reforms. On balance, however, both factors together led to 
a similar outcome: Argentine business elites and Soviet managers accepting some 
degree of market-style reform and liberalization.
The state’s retreat from the economy had a series of consequences. The positions 
of business elites were reinforced by the conviction that, as in the past, the best 
strategy was to “stay inside” the state in order to negotiate specifi c policies, rather 
than to break relations; open protest was not a good option because it would reduce 
the space for bargaining. In fact, the reforms resulted in economic and political 
losses. They also implied a change in the system of interest representation that 
changed the links between business and the state. The most powerful businessses—
or at least those of them that survived—won autonomy because they were able to 
29 A small and select set of economic groups, with informal access to the state and diversifi ed 
investments, had been favored by the military government. Some of them, as we have seen, 
profi ted from the privatizations of the 1990s, while others lost the infl uence they had gained 
during the previous decade.
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lobby individually with the government. In fact, they won autonomy in a double 
sense: from the government and from other companies. However, most companies, 
and particularly members of the business associations, did not win autonomy. On the 
contrary, once state intervention was reduced, they lost their capacity for nego-
tiation.
In sum, reforms created a new scenario in which the asymmetries produced 
fragmentation and differentiation within the business fi eld (Schvarzer 2001; Schorr 
2004; Sidicaro, 2002). At the same time, as a result of the massive arrival of foreign 
investment along with the withdrawal of the state, once the reforms were introduced, 
local business had to compete with powerful foreign adversaries supported by their 
countries of origin. Therefore, the privileges previously held by powerful Argentine 
companies were called into question in a situation of heightened competition.
CONCLUSIONS
The comparison of initial stages of economic reforms in Russia and Argentina 
shows how historical and ideological aspects intervened in the decision-making 
process of those economic elites who supported the reforms. The comparison shows 
that decisions were not based on “inherent” or “natural” characteristics of local 
business but conditioned by past experiences and uncertainty regarding the future. 
Overall, rationality in managerial and elite decision-making was thus conditioned in 
the USSR and Argentina by experiences and expectations established through 
stochastic learning in the context of reforms that were suffi ciently vague and 
contingent to allow managers and elites to write a happy future into reforms. The key 
factor for understanding their support of the reforms is not their capacity (or lack 
thereof) to foresee the future, but the fact that decisions are only intentionally 
rational. Limits on rationality are given not only by limited access to information 
about the future but also, and more importantly, by the role of ideas and habitus in 
the decision-making.
This is not to suggest that we have exhausted the variables and processes at 
work in these two cases: further comparative work on internal organizational routines 
and organizational fi elds would shed more light on why managers and elites chose 
the tactics that they did. We suggest that greater attention to Bourdieusian 
dynamics—stocks and use of capital (social, economic, political, cultural), fi eld 
structures and meanings, and content and change in habitus—will add complexity 
and reality to the over-simplistic models of organizational behavior, too reliant on 
the idea of rational choice, that are at the core of much writing on political economy. 
Stochastic learning and anchoring suggest that economic sociologists have been on 
the right track, and that policy analysis and policy-making need to make meanings, 
experiences, and such learning more central. Ambiguity may be unavoidable, given 
the usual politics of reform; but if this is the case, we need to dispel the illusion that 
technocratic structures inside the state are the best way to reform, for no matter 
what economists may say about the need for particular changes, politics will end up 
confusing the reform process. Actors will naturally go with what they know. It may 
also be that those engaged in considering reform politics need to keep in mind the 
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likelihood of unexpected outcomes and be ready to address them, perhaps through 
more business and welfare safety nets or reform timing, sequencing, and duration, 
thus allowing for more complicated learning to take place. This was certainly key to 
the “gradualism” school of economic reform: give actors time to adjust. Alternatively, 
rapid reforms might require the heavy hand of the state to act against actors who did 
not choose wisely from the outset; but such “technocratic Stalinism” might have 
costs that are ultimately too high, not only in economic but also in human terms. 
If this analysis suggests anything, it is that managers and business elites are human, 
and so reform will be a messy process; to expect too much rationality might be as 
unhelpful as assuming none at all.
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